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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Appellant David Graves ("Graves") files this appeal from a decision of the 
Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County modifying the original custody 
order regarding the parties' children and granting custody of the children to 
Appellee Tricia Clements ("Clements"). This Court has jurisdiction over Graves' 
appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(h) (Supp. 1996). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
ISSUE: DID THE TRIAL COURT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN 
FINDING A MATERIAL CHANGE IN CIRCUMSTANCES 
HAD OCCURRED AND AFFECTED THE FUNCTIONING OF 
THE CUSTODIAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN GRAVES AND 
HIS CHILDREN? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: 
A TRIAL COURT'S FACTUAL FINDINGS UNDERLYING A 
HOLDING OF MATERIAL CHANGE OF CIRCUMSTANCES 
IN A DIVORCE DECREE AND A DETERMINATION OF THE 
CHILDREN'S BEST INTERESTS MAY NOT BE DISTURBED 
UNLESS CLEARLY ERRONEOUS. A COURT'S LEGAL 
CONCLUSION AS TO WHETHER A MATERIAL CHANGE IN 
CIRCUMSTANCES HAS OCCURRED THAT WOULD 
WARRANT RECONSIDERING THE DIVORCE DECREE IS 
REVIEWED FOR AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION. ATRIAL 
JUDGE'S AWARD OF CUSTODY AND SUPPORT IS ALSO 
REVIEWED FOR ABUSE OF DISCRETION. 
AUTHORITY: Cummings v.Cummings. 821 P.2d 472,476 (Utah App. 
1991) 
Wells v. Wells. 871 P.2d 1036, 1038 (Utah App. 1994) 
Sukin v. Sukin. 842 P.2d 922, 923 (Utah App. 1992) 
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS 
There are no statutes or constitutional provisions that are determinative in 
this appeal. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case: 
Graves appeals from the trial court's order amending the parties' 
decree of divorce. The amended order terminated the then-existing 
joint custody order and awarded Clements the sole care, control 
and custody of the parties' four (4) minor children. The trial court 
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found that the joint custody arrangement was "an extremely good 
way of doing things," but that things have changed drastically" 
since Clements remarried in March 1995. 
Course of the Proceedings: 
The parties were divorced April 7, 1992, in the Third Judicial 
District Court of Salt Lake County. The decree of divorce entered 
into at the time dictated that the parties be awarded the joint care 
and custody of the four minor children, and that Graves be the 
primary caretaker and have the physical custody of the children 
subject to Clements' rights of reasonable visitation. In August 
1995, Clements filed a petition to modify the divorce decree and 
sought to gain physical custody of the children. On October 24, 
1995, Commissioner Lisa Jones of the above-mentioned court 
heard Clements' motion for a change of custody. After 
interviewing the minor children, receiving proffers of testimony and 
argument from counsel on Clements' motion for temporary order 
and Clements' motion for independent custody evaluation, and 
taking the contested issues under advisement, Commissioner Jones 
ordered in a minute entry under advisement recommendation that 
"it is in the best interest of the minor children to remain in the 
physical custody of [Graves]." It was also found that "[Clements] 
attempted to influence the children." A custody evaluation was 
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then ordered. 
Disposition at Trial Court: 
On October 17-18, 1996, Clements' Amended Petition to Modify 
Decree of Divorce came before the Third Judicial District Court, 
the Honorable Judge Thorne presiding. In his order, Judge Thorne 
held that "things have changed drastically resulting in the requisite 
material change in circumstance . . . . [and] that the above-
referenced material change in circumstance occurred in March of 
1995 when the Defendant [Clements] married Garry Waye 
Clements." Judge Thorne terminated the existing custody order 
and awarded Clements the sole care, control and custody of the 
children. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
David Graves and Tricia Clements were married in Salt Lake City on 
August 7, 1982. To their union were born Amy and David, twins - 12 years old, 
Michael - 9 years old, and Daniel - 7 years old. Graves worked as an insurance 
agent for New York Life Insurance Company and for ten years in the banking 
industry. He left his job as an insurance agent in 1990 to return to the University 
of Utah to earn his college degree. Graves and Clements arranged that Clements 
would work while Graves completed his studies. 
Around March 1991, Clements stated that she wanted a divorce from 
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Graves and moved out of the family home. (Transcript, p. 331.) As the reason for 
the separation, Graves alleges that Clements had an extra-marital affair; she denies 
this claim. (Transcript, p. 518-22.) The parties were divorced on April 7, 1992, 
and they were awarded joint care and custody of the children, with Graves being 
designated as the primary caretaker with physical custody, and Clements being 
granted visitation rights. (Transcript, p. 183.) Clements was ordered to pay child 
support, but did not meet her obligation and presently owes over $15,000 in past 
due child support. (Transcript, p. 448-50.) 
Since 1990, Graves has rented a three-bedroom apartment in a middle-class 
neighborhood at 147 University Village, Salt Lake City. The apartment contains 
its own kitchen and bathroom, and when the children lived with Graves, each child 
had his or her own bed. The custody evaluator, Manuel de la Torre, L.C.S.W., 
toured the home and noted "it was fairly clean and orderly. The furnishings 
appeared to be in good repair. The apartment has a common outside area with 
swings, a merry-go-round and other play toys." (Custody Evaluation, p. 3.) For 
six years the children lived with their father at the same address, attending the 
same schools, and playing with the same friends. Graves received a total of $1,742 
a month from AFDC, student aid and child support while he was in school. 
Clements began living with Garry Waye Clements in June 1992. 
(Transcript, p. 383.) Since that time, they have resided in a 5-bedroom home in a 
middle-class neighborhood in West Jordan. (Transcript, p. 424, 437.) They were 
married in March 1995. 
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In August 1995, Clements sought sole custody of the children by filing a 
petition to modify the divorce decree. On October 17-18, 1996, Clements' 
Amended Petition to Modify Decree of Divorce came before the Third Judicial 
District Court, the Honorable Judge Thorne presiding. During the trial, Graves 
provided the court seven (7) separate character references supporting his skills and 
abilities as a parent. The wide variety of references included: an LDS clergyman 
relating his observations of Graves with his children, several University classmates 
and professors commenting on Graves's dedicated efforts at school and his care 
and concern for his children, and the director of the child care center where the 
four minor children have attended since June of 1994, commenting that Graves 
was "cooperative, sensitive to the children's needs, and kind and nurturing with the 
children." In addition, Graves offered an affidavit from a neighbor, a registered 
nurse who knew both Graves and Clements for eight years, stating that "Graves 
has always possessed a calm, caring attitude toward his children." 
The trial court found that the joint custody arrangement was "an extremely 
good way of doing things," but that things have changed drastically" since 
Clements remarried in March 1995. (See Transcript, p. 570-71.) The court found 
that since that time, the joint custody co-parenting relationship had deteriorated. 
The court specifically held that at the time of Clements' remarriage, Graves began 
treating his relationship with her as a "f,tug-of-war,f" to see who would keep the 
children. (Transcript, p. 571.) The court held that a material change in 
circumstances occurred in March of 1995 when Clements remarried, and the court 
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terminated the joint custody order and awarded Clements sole custody of the 
children. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Utah courts have clearly outlined the two-part procedure for modification 
of child custody decrees. The first step involves a determination that a 
"substantial" change of circumstances has occurred since the time of the last 
decree, and the second step focuses on the best interests of the children. In this 
case, the trial court incorrectly applied the first step of the test. The trial court 
relied too heavily on the fact that Clements remarried, and ignored the effect the 
bitter custody dispute had on the joint custody co-parenting relationship. The court 
erred in allowing Clements to rely on circumstances she created by initiating the 
custody battle. The artificially created "change in circumstances" is not sufficient 
to remove the children from Graves and put them in Clements custody. 
The Utah Supreme Court has stated that the requisite change must 
substantially and materially affect the custodial parent's parenting ability or the 
functioning of the custodial relationship. In this case, the evidence did not show a 
material change in the custodial parenting relationship between Graves and the 
children. Nothing "substantial" or "material" changed in David Graves' 
relationship with his children to warrant Clements being awarded custody. Since 
the original divorce decree, Graves and the children have lived in the same home 
and attended the same schools and the same day care center. The only change in 
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this case is that Clements remarried and initiated a custody battle. The first test of 
the Utah courts that the change must essentially affect the custodial relationship 
was never met, and the trial court erred in awarding physical custody of the four 
children to Clements. 
ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN FINDING A 
MATERIAL CHANGE IN CIRCUMSTANCES OCCURRED AND AFFECTED 
THE FUNCTIONING OF THE CUSTODIAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN 
GRAVES AND HIS CHILDREN. THE TRIAL COURT THEREFORE ERRED 
IN MODIFYING THE CUSTODY ORDER. 
The trial court erred by focusing on the fact that Clements remarried and 
by ignoring the detrimental effect the child custody litigation had on the joint 
custody co-parenting relationship. In doing so, the trial court misapplied 
longstanding Utah case law on the subject, and therefore the custody modification 
should be overturned by this court. 
The Utah Supreme Court has outlined the two-part procedure which trial 
courts must follow in modifying custody arrangements. The trial court must first 
"receive evidence only as to the nature and materiality of any change in those 
circumstances upon which the earlier award of custody was based." Hogge v. 
Hoggs, 649 P.2d 51, 54 (1982). The Utah Supreme Court revisited this first step 
in Becker v. Becker, where it added "it is not sufficient merely to allege a change 
which, although otherwise substantial, does not essentially affect the custodial 
relationship . . . .[and] the asserted change must, therefore, have some material 
relationship to and substantial effect on parenting ability or the functioning of the 
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presently existing custodial relationship." 694 P.2d 608, 610 (1984) (holding that 
the trial court was justified in finding no substantial change in circumstances since 
the divorce, despite fact that the former wife had matured, settled down and 
remarried). 
The reasoning behind the Supreme Court's rulings on this subject is clear. 
The two-part procedure was designed "to protect the custodial parent from 
harassment by repeated litigation and protect the childfren] from 'ping-pong' 
custody awards." Hoggs, 649 P.2d at 53-54. "The rationale is that custody 
placements, once made, should be as stable as possible unless the factual basis for 
them has completely changed." Becker. 694 P.2d at 610. The Court in Hogge 
noted that the Oregon courts emphasized c<the importance of a stable and secure 
home life for children who are shifted from one parent to another and required to 
make adjustments attendant upon such changes." LL at 54, quoting Remillard and 
Remillard- 30 Or. App. 1111, 569 P.2d 651, 653 (1977). Moreover, "[t]he 
'change of circumstances' threshold is high to discourage frequent petitions for 
modification of custody decrees." Kramer v. Kramer. 738 P.2d 624, 626 (Utah 
1987). 
In the present case, the facts show that the custodial relationship between 
Graves and his children did not substantially or materially change since the original 
divorce. All the vital, relevant aspects of a child's life remained the same for the 
Graves' children during this time. They slept in the same beds, lived in the same 
home, attended the same day care center and schools, and played with the same 
13 
friends. More importantly, the parent-child relationship with their father did not 
substantially or materially change during this time. And, although Clements has 
remarried, "it is not sufficient merely to allege a change which, although otherwise 
substantial, does not essentially affect the custodial relationship." Becker. 694 
P.2d at 610. A noncustodial parent's change of circumstances is not relevant. 
Kramer. 738 P.2d at 627. 
It could be argued that in a joint custody situation, the circumstances of 
both parents are relevant because both have a custodial relationship with the 
children. However, such a position is inconsistent with Utah law. In Crouse v. 
Crouse. 817 P.2d 836 (Utah 1991), the divorce decree provided for joint legal 
custody of the parties' two children, and granted primary physical custody to Mrs. 
Crouse. Seeking primary physical custody of the children, Mr. Crouse filed a 
petition to modify the divorce decree. In support of his petition, Mr. Crouse 
offered evidence that he had moved from an apartment into a house. The trial 
court denied the petition, finding that Mr. Crouse failed to prove a material change 
in circumstances sufficient to alter the custody order. The Utah Court of Appeals 
affirmed the trial court and noted that a noncustodial parent's change in housing 
arrangements is generally not sufficient to justify a modification of custody. 
Crouse. 817 P.2d at 839-40. The Crouse decision illustrates that the Hogge change 
in circumstances test applies in a joint custody situation, and the parent with 
primary physical custody of the children is considered the custodial parent. 
Accordingly, in the case at bar Clements had the burden to prove a material change 
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in the custodial parenting relationship between Graves and the children. The 
evidence shows this burden was not met. 
The court found that the joint custody parenting arrangement deteriorated 
and broke down after Clements remarried in March 1995. However, the record 
contains no evidence indicating that the breakdown in the co-parenting 
arrangement was tied to or caused by Clements' remarriage. Clements has lived 
with her new husband since 1992, and there is no evidence showing that her 1995 
marriage affected the joint custody relationship. Rather, the evidence clearly 
shows that the breakdown in the co-parenting arrangement was caused and 
facilitated by the commencement of child custody litigation. 
Graves testified that "the entire court case has created an artificial problem 
here." (Transcript, p. 229.) He characterized the litigation as a "bitter court 
battle," (Transcript, p. 230), and felt it appropriate that "under the circumstances" 
he should not directly communicate with Clements regarding the children's welfare. 
(Transcript, p. 191-92.) Graves stated that he used to have a very good co-
parenting relationship with Clements, and "that's the way it will be again when this 
is all over." (Transcript, p. 212.) Graves also testified that "once the case is over 
and settled, things will settle down and we can begin again." (Transcript, p. 201.) 
Finally, Graves admitted that in the last year, because of the court case, he did not 
involve Clements in decisions concerning attention deficit disorder (ADD) 
counseling and medication for Michael or David. (Transcript, p. 270.) Prior to 
the litigation, Graves involved Clements in every such decision. (Transcript, p. 
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270.) 
The causal relationship between the beginning of the custody battle and the 
breakdown of the co-parenting arrangement is illustrated by the timing of the 
problems noted by the trial court. In the 1994-95 school year, Graves and 
Clements shared custody of the children; each had them for 2 weeks per month. 
(Transcript, p. 341.) They discontinued this system because it caused problems 
with the childrenfs schoolwork. (Transcript, p. 342, 401.) Then, in August 1995, 
Clements initiated the custody battle, and the co-parenting difficulties followed. 
Beginning in October 1995, Graves refused to accept Clements' telephone 
calls at home because they led to chaos with the children. (Transcript, p. 199-200, 
343-44.) The court noted that Graves made a vulgar remark to Clements; this 
occurred in June 1996. (Transcript, p. 197.) The school registration forms which 
failed to include Clements were prepared in 1996. (Transcript, p. 202.) The 
evidence showed a visitation problem occurred on June 14, 1996, and also on 
August 11, 1996. (Transcript, p. 225-26.) According to Clements, her visitation 
has not been very liberal since November 1995. (Transcript, p. 395.) Graves 
testified that he has had almost no contact with Clements in the last 9 to 10 
months, and that they handle matters through their attorneys. (Transcript, p. 211-
12.) 
When considering the effect the bitter custody dispute has taken on Graves 
and the joint parenting relationship, it is important to remember that Graves suffers 
from chronic fatigue syndrome (Transcript, p. 213, 294), has been diagnosed with 
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depression (Transcript, p. 297-99), and is under significant stress. (Transcript, p. 
299.) He admitted that all the fighting upset him and that he sometimes says 
inappropriate things "in the heat of battle." (Transcript, p. 229, 234.) In fact, at 
one point Graves even advocated splitting the children up for the purpose of 
ending the litigation. (Transcript, p. 287.) It is obvious that the custody battle 
Clements initiated has taken its toll on Graves and on the co-parenting relationship. 
The evidence clearly shows that the breakdown in the joint custody 
parenting arrangement was directly caused by the child custody litigation. The trial 
court erred in allowing Clements to rely on and benefit from the problematic 
circumstances she created by initiating the custody battle. 
In Fullmer v. Fullmer 761 P.2d 942 (Utah App. 1988), the court 
considered a similar situation. In that case, Mrs. Fullmer, the custodial parent, was 
preparing to move to New York City and had quit her job, moved out of her 
apartment, and sold most of her belongings. The night before her scheduled 
departure, Mr. Fullmer served her with his petition to modify the child custody 
order, together with a restraining order prohibiting her from leaving the state. 
Mrs. Fullmer was forced to hire an attorney and hurriedly arrange temporary living 
accommodations and employment. The trial court modified the custody order and 
awarded custody to Mr. Fullmer, based on his solid employment and more stable 
environment. In reversing the trial court, the appellate court noted that although 
Mrs. Fullmer's housing accomodations and employment were unstable after the 
filing of the petition, "any changes in her circumstances were, in large part, a 
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consequence of respondent's [Mr. Fullmerfs] conduct." JsL at 948 The court 
concluded that "Respondent [Mr. Fullmer] cannot use the circumstances he 
created to reopen the child custody issue. To hold otherwise would provide 
incentive to noncustodial parents to create havoc in the custodial parent's 
circumstances in order to justify reconsideration of the custody award." LL at 948. 
The same rationale applies to the present case. The breakdown in the joint 
custody co-parenting relationship was a direct consequence of Clements' conduct 
in initiating the "tug-of-war" custody battle. By commencing this emotionally 
difficult litigation, Clements essentially facilitated the deterioration of the co-




Because there was no change of circumstances which materially affected 
the custodial relationship that Graves had with his four children, the trial court 
erred in terminating the existing custody order and awarding Clements sole 
custody. In addition, the trial court erred by allowing Clements to rely on the 
negative circumstances she created by initiating the custody dispute. The trial court 
misapplied Utah case law on the subject, and thus the amended order in this case 
should be overturned. i 
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Attorney for Appellant 
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Salt Lake City, Utah 84105 
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